Abstract. We consider Nonlinear Equilibrium (NE) for the optimal allocation of limited resources. The NE is a generalization of Walras-Wald equilibrium, which is equivalent to J. Nash equilibrium in n-person concave games. Finding NE is equivalent to solving a variational inequality (VI) with a monotone and smooth operator on Ω = R n + ⊗ R m + . Projection on Ω is a very simple procedure; therefore, our main focus is two methods for which the projection on Ω is the main operation. Both pseudo-gradient projection (PGP) and extra pseudo-gradient (EPG) methods require O(n 2 ) operations per step, because in both cases the main operation per step is matrix by vector multiplication.
Introduction
For several decades, Linear Programming (LP) has been widely used for optimal resource allocation. In 1975, L.V. Kantorovich and T.C. Koopmans shared the Nobel Prize in Economics "for their contributions to the theory of optimum allocation of limited resources".
The LP approach uses two fundamental assumptions: a) The price vector c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) T for goods is fixed, given a priori and independent of the production output vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n )
T . b) The resource vector b = (b 1 , . . . , b m )
T is also fixed, given a priori and the resource availability is independent of the resource price vector λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ n )
T .
Unfortunately, such assumptions do not reflect the basic market law of supply and demand. Therefore, the LP models might lead to solutions which are not always practical. Also, a small change of at least one component of the price vector c might lead to a drastic change of the primal solution. Similarly, a small variation of the resource vector b might lead to a dramatic change of the dual solution.
We consider an alternative to the LP approach for optimal resource allocation, which is based on the Generalized Walras-Wald Equilibrium [15] .
The fixed price vector c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) T is replaced by a price operator c : R T . We call the pair of vectors y * = (x * , λ * ) ∈ Ω : + guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the NE [15] .
In this paper, we relax the strong monotonicity assumptions for both operators c : R The projected gradient method for convex optimization was introduced in the 60's (see [7] , [13] ). Some variations of this method were used in [3] for solving VI. The projected gradient method for convex optimization has mainly theoretical value, because even in case of linear constraints it requires solving at each step a quadratic programming problem. In case of simple feasible sets, however, the projected gradient type methods can be very efficient. In this paper, we used projected pseudo-gradient type methods for solving VI, which is equivalent to (1.1)-(1.2). Projection on Ω is a very simple procedure; therefore, the main operation per step is computing the pseudo-gradient, which requires only matrix by vector multiplication.
We show that under local strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the operators b and c the PGP converges globally with Q-linear rate and the ratio depends only on the condition number of the VI operator. We establish complexity bound for the PGP method in terms of the condition number, the size of the problem and the required accuracy. This is our first contribution.
In the absence of strong monotonicity at the equilibrium y * , the convergence of the PGP becomes problematic. Therefore in the second part, of the paper we consider the extra pseudo-gradient (EPG) method.
The extragradient method was first introduced by G. Korpelevich in the 70's for finding saddle points [11] . Over the years, it became an important tool for solving VI (see [1] , [2] , [4] - [6] , [8] - [11] and references therein).
Application of the EPG for finding NE leads to a two-stage algorithm. At the first stage, the EPG predicts both the production and the price vector. At the second stage, it corrects them dependent on the prices for the predicted output and resource availability for the predicted resource prices. It requires projecting the primal-dual vector on Ω twice, which is still only O(n 2 ) operations.
We also show that the EPG method converges to the NE y * if both the price c and resource b operators are just monotone and satisfy Lipschitz condition. This is our second contribution.
Under local strong monotonicity, the EPG method globally converges with Q-linear rate, and the ratio is defined by the condition number of the VI operator. For a small condition number, the EPG has a better ratio and a much better complexity bound than the PGP. This is our third contribution.
The paper is organized as follows. The basic assumptions are introduced in the following section. In Section 3, we recall the difference between the classical Walras-Wald equilibrium and NE and show the equivalence of finding NE to solving a particular VI. In Section 4, we establish convergence properties and the complexity bound of the PGP. In Section 5, we prove convergence of the EPG method under minimum assumptions on the input data. In Section 6, we establish global Qlinear convergence rate and the complexity bound for the EPG. In the Appendix, we estimate the Lipschitz constant for the VI operator, which plays an important role in both the PGP and EPG methods. We conclude the paper by discussing important properties of the NE and the fundamental differences between NE and LE.
Basic Assumptions.
We consider an economy which produces n goods by consuming m resources. The following three sets of data are required for problem formulation: 1) the technological matrix A : R n + → R m + which "transforms" resources into goods, i.e., a ij defines the amount of factor 1 ≤ i ≤ m, which is required to produce one item of good 1 ≤ j ≤ n; 2) the resource operator b : R , where c j (x) is the price for one item of good j under the production output x = (x 1 , . . . , x j , . . . , x n ). We assume that the matrix A does not have zero rows or columns, which means that each resource is used for the production of at least one of the goods and each good requires at least one of the resources.
Under strong monotonicity of b on R m + and c on R n + , the NE y * exists and is unique. Finding y * is equivalent to solving a VI with a strongly monotone operator on Ω. Therefore, under Lipschitz condition for b and c, the PGP generates a primal-dual sequence, which converges to y * with Q-linear rate [15] . In this paper, we replace the global strong monotonicity of b and c with corresponding properties only at the NE y * :
In the first part, we also replace the global Lipschitz continuity of b and c by corresponding local assumptions:
where · is the Euclidean norm. We will say that the price and resource operators are well-defined if (2.1)-(2.4) hold.
The assumption (2.1) implies that an increase of the price λ i for any resource 1 ≤ i ≤ m when the rest is fixed at the equilibrium level leads to an increase of the resource availability b i (λ) and the margin for the resource increase has a positive lower bound. Conversely, it follows from (2.2) that any increase of production x j , 1 ≤ i ≤ n when the rest is fixed at the equilibrium level leads to a decrease of the price c j (x) per item for good j. Moreover, the margin of the price decrease has a negative upper bound.
In other words, at the equilibrium the resource availability has to be sensitive to the prices variation and the prices for a product has to be sensitive to production variation.
The Lipschitz conditions (2.3)-(2.4) assume that deviation from the NE can not lead to uncontrolled changes of prices for goods and resource availability.
Generalized Walras-Wald Equilibrium.
In this section, we recall that NE is a generalization of Walras-Wald (WW) equilibrium, which is equivalent to a particular VI.
The notion of equilibrium in a concave n-person game was introduced by J. Nash in 1950 [14] . He received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1994 for his discovery. For many years it was not clear whether J. Nash equilibrium had anything to do with economic equilibrium introduced as early as 1874 by Leon Walras in his most renowned work "Elements of Pure Economics". Moreover, it had not been clear for a long time whether Walras equations have a solution.
The first substantial contribution was due to Abraham Wald, who in the mid-1930's proved the existence of Walras equilibrium under some special assumptions on the price vector-fuction c(x). These assumptions, unfortunately, were hard to justify from an economic standpoint [12] .
In the mid-1950's, Harold Kuhn modified the WW model. H. Kuhn's version of WW equilibrium consists of finding y * = (x * ; λ * ):
He proved the existence of the WW equilibrium under minimum assumptions on the input data, using two basic tools: Kakutani's fixed point Theorem (1941) to show the existance of x * ∈ R n + in (3.1) and LP Duality (1947) to show the existance of λ * ∈ R m + in (3.2). The equivalence of H. Kuhn's version of WW equilibrium and J. Nash equilibrium in a concave n-person game was established in [17] .
One obtains WW equilibrium from NE by assuming b(λ) = b in (1.1)-(1.2). So the NE (1.1)-(1.2) is a natural extension of the WW equilibrium, which makes it in a sense "symmetric".
Our next step is to recall that finding NE from (1.1)-1.2) is equivalent to solving a particular variational inequality (VI).
We assume that NE y
Proof. For a given y ∈ Ω, we consider the following map
. In [15] , it was shown that NE y * = (x * , λ * ) is a fixed point of the map (3.4), i.e.,
Under a fixed y ∈ Ω, the gradient of
For the convex optimization problem (3.5), the fact that y * is among its solutions means that for y * the following optimality criteria holds
In other words, NE y * = (x * , λ * ) is a solution of VI (3.6). On the other hand, for any solutionȳ = (x;λ) of VI (3.6), we have
For y = 0 from (3.7) follows
It follows from (3.8) thatx is a feasible solution for the primal LP
andλ is a feasible solution for the dual LP
It follows from (3.10) that for the primal feasible solutionx and dual feasible solutionλ the complementarity conditions
are satisfied. Thereforex solves (3.11) andλ solves (3.12), i.e.,x = x
Solving (3.13), generally speaking, is more difficult than solving the corresponding primal-dual LP, i.e., (1.1)-1.2) when b(λ) ≡ b and c(x) ≡ c. It may seem that finding NE y * = (x * , λ * ) is more difficult than solving the VI (3.13). In fact, as we will see later, finding NE y * = (x * ; λ * ) in a number of instances can be much easier than solving the corresponding LP.
The fundamental difference between NE (1.1)-1.2) and WW (3.13) follows from the geometry of their feasible sets Ω = R n + ⊗ R m + and D. The simplicity of Ω makes pseudo-gradient projection type methods particularly suitable for solving VI (3.3), because it requires matrix by vector multiplication as the main operation per step whereas pseudo-gradient projection methods for solving VI (3.13) require solving a quadratic programming problem at each step.
In the following sections, we will concentrate on a pseudo-gradient projection method for solving VI (3.3).
Pseudo-Gradient Projection Method
Let Q be a closed convex set in R n , then for each u ∈ R q there is a nearest
The vector v is called a projection of u on Q. Later we will need the following two well-known properties of the projection operator P Q (see, for example, [15] ).
First, the operator
iff for any t > 0 the vector u * is a fixed point of the map
For a vector u ∈ R q , the projection on R q + is given by the formula
where for 1 ≤ i ≤ q we have
+ is defined by the following formula
We recall that the VI operator g : Ω → R n+m is defined by the formula
We are ready to describe the PGP method for solving the VI (3.3). Let
++ be a starting point and (x s ; λ s ) has already been found. The PGP method finds the next approximation y s+1 by the formula
In other words, each step of the PGP method consists of updating the production vector x s and the price vector λ s by the following formulas:
The step length t > 0 will be specified later. The method (4.5)-4.6) can be viewed as a projected explicit Euler method for solving the following system of differential equations
On the other hand, the PGP method (4.5)-4.6) can be viewed as a pricing mechanism for finding equilibrium. It follows from (4.5) that if the current price c j (x s ) for an item of good j exceeds the expenses (A T λ s ) j required to produce this item, then the production of good j has to be increased. On the other hand, if the current price c j (x s ) is less than the current expenses (A T λ s ) j , then the production of good j has to be reduced. It follows from (4.6) that if the current consumption (Ax s ) i of resource i exceeds the current availability b i (λ s ), then the price for the resource has to be increased.If the availability b i (λ s ) of resource i exceeds consumption (Ax s ) i , then the price for an item of the resource has to be reduced. 
Proof. We have
Using (2.1) and (2.2) for γ = min{α, β}, we obtain (4.7) 
For the proof of Lemma 2 and the upper bound for L see the Appendix.
Remark 2. We will assume later that for a given x ∈ R n finding c(x) does not require more than O(n 2 ) operations, and for a given λ ∈ R m finding b(λ) does not require more than O(m 2 ) operations. We also assume that n ≥ m. From (4.5)-(4.6) follows that each step of the PGP method (4.4) does not require more than O(n 2 ) operations. 
2) for t = γL −2 = min{q(t)|t > 0}, the following bound holds
3) for the PGP complexity, we have the following bound
where ε > 0 is the required accuracy.
Proof. 1) From (4.4), non-expansive property of operator P Ω (4.1) and optimality criteria (4.2) follows
For well-defined b and c from (4.7) (4.8) and (4.12), we obtain
Hence for 0 < t < 2γL −2 , we have 0 < q(t)
In other words, the projection operator (4.4) is contractive, which means that for any given t ∈ (0, 2γL −2 ) the PGP method globally converges with Q-linear rate, i.e., (4.9) holds.
2) For t = γL −2 = argmin{q(t)|t > 0}, we have
2 , i.e., (4.10) holds.
3) Let 0 < ε 1 be the required accuracy, then in view of (4.10) it takes O((ln q) −1 ln ε) steps to find an ε-approximation for the NE y * = (x * , λ * ). It follows from Remark 2 that each PGP step (4.4) does not require more than O(n 2 ) operations. Therefore, finding the ε-approximation to NE y * = (x * , λ * ) requires
In view of (ln q
, so for the overall complexity of the PGP method we obtain (4.11).
If γ = min{α, β} = 0, then pseudo-gradient g : Ω → R m+n defined by (4.3) is not even locally strongly monotone, therefore (4.9) cannot guarantee convergence of the PGP method (4.4). In the following section, we consider the extra pseudogradient method (EPG) for finding NE (1.1)-(1.2) in the absence of local strong monotonicity of both operators b and c.
The extragradient method was first introduced by G. Korpelevich ( [11] ) in the 70s for finding saddle points. Lately, it became a popular tool for solving VI (see [1] , [2] , [4] - [6] , [8] - [11] and references therein).
First we show that EPG converges to the NE for any monotone operators b and c which satisfy a Lipschitz condition on
Extra Pseudo-Gradient Method for finding NE
The application of G. Korpelevich's extragradient method [11] for solving VI (3.3) leads to the following extra pseudo-gradient (EPG) method for finding NE y * = (x * ; λ * ). Each step of the EPG method consists in two phases: the predictor phase and the corrector phase. We start with initial approximation y 0 = (x 0 ; λ 0 )) ∈ R The corrector phase finds the new approximation
The step length t > 0 will be specified later.
In other words, the first phase predicts the new production vector
and a new price vectorλ
The pair (x s ;λ s ), in turn, predicts the price vector c(x s ) = (c 1 (x s ) , . . . , c n (x s )) and the resource availibility vector b(λ s ) = (b 1 (λ s ), . . . , b m (λ s )) .
The second phase corrects the production vector The formulas (5.1)-(5.2) can be viewed as a pricing mechanism for finding the NE y * = (x * ; λ * ). 
Therefore, for a given t > 0 and ∀y ∈ Ω we have
From (5.1), (5.2) and non-expansive property of the operator P Ω , which is defined by (4.1), as well as Lipschitz condition (4.13), we obtain
By taking y = y s+1 in (5.7), we obtain
Then using (5.9), we obtain
Therefore, from (5.11) we have
By adding (5.10) and (5.12), we obtain
Adding the last inequality to the left hand side of (5.13) and using the monotonicity inequality
Using identity
with u = y s , v = y s+1 , and w = y * , we obtain
Using the same identity with u = y s , v =ŷ s , and w = y s+1 , we obtain
Therefore, we can rewrite (5.14) as follows:
By adding up the last inequality from s = 0 to s = N , we obtain
which means that for 0 < t <
, we obtain
In 
i.e.,ȳ = P Ω (ȳ + tg(ȳ)) for t > 0. Therefore from (4.2) followsȳ = y * , which together with ||y s+1 − y * || < ||y s − y * || for s ≥ 1 leads to lim s→∞ y s = y * . The proof of Theorem 2 is completed.
Remark 6. From (5.16) for any 0 < t < (
2 ) from (5.17), we obtain
Using the triangle inequality
we can rewrite (5.17) as follows:
Let r = ||y s+1 − y * || ||y s − y * || −1 , then we can rewrite the last inequality as follows:
In the following section, we show that under local strong monotonicity (2.1)-(2.2) and Lipschitz condition (4.13), the EPG method (5.1)-(5.2) converges globally with Q-linear rate, i.e., (5.19) takes place with 0 < q < 1.
Moreover, the EPG has a better ratio and in a number of instances much better complexity bound than the PPG.
Convergence rate of the EPG method
It follows from (2.1), (2.2) and Lemma 1 that for γ = min{α, β}, we have
Keeping in mind that (g(y * ), y − y * ) ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ Ω from (6.1), we obtain the following bounds hold:
3) for any κ ∈ [0, 0.5] we have
Proof. 1) It follows from (5.1)-(5.2), the non-expansive property of the projection operator P Ω and Lipschitz condition (4.13) that
Using arguments in the proof of Theorem 5, we obtain Using
we can rewrite (6.7) as follows:
2 , we can rewrite the third and fourth term of the left hand side as follows:
Therefore from (6.8) we have
Hence, for q(t) = 1 − 2γt + 4(γt) 2 (ν(t)) −1 , we obtain
2) For t = 1 2L and κ = γL −1 we have
It is easy to see that for every t ∈ (0, ( √ 2L) −1 ) we have 0 < q(t) < 1.
3) It follows from (6.9) that for any 0 ≤ κ ≤ 0.5, we have
Therefore the bound (6.3) holds.
4) It follows from (6.3) that for a given accuracy 0 < 1 and q = √ 1 − 0.5κ, the EPG method requires that 
i.e., the bound (6.4) holds true.
Remark 8. For small κ > 0, the complexity bound (6.4) is much better than the PGP bound (4.11). On the other hand, the EPG requires two projections at each step instead of one, as in the case of PGP, but keeping in mind the relatively low cost to project on Ω one can still expect the EPG to be more efficient. However, in the case when 1 > κ > 0.5 and n is large enough, then the PGP could be more efficient.
Appendix
The important part of both the PGP and EPG methods is the Lipschitz constant L > 0 in (4.13).
Let us find an upper bound for L > 0. To simplify our considerations, we assume that the matrix A is rescaled, so
We assume as always that the components of vector functions c(x) and b(λ) satisfy Lipschitz condition, i.e., for any 1
Using (7.2), we obtain
Using (7.3), we obtain
, in view of (7.1), we have
Hence, from (7.4) follows 
Concluding Remarks
The "symmetrization" of the classical Walras-Wald Equilibrium (3.1)-(3.2) was achieved by replacing the fixed resource vector b by the resource operator b : R m + → R m + (see [15] ). This is not only justifiable from the market standpoint but it leads to new methods, which are based on projection type techniques for solving VI. At each step, the production vector x s and the price vector λ s are updated by simple formulas and it can be done in parallel. In other words, one can view both PGP and EPG as primal-dual decomposition methods.
The complexity bounds (4.11) and (6.4) show that in a number of instances finding NE by PGP or EPG can be cheaper than solving a correspondent LP by interior point methods.
Both PGP and EPG can be used for very large scale resources allocation problems when simplex or interior point methods for solving LP are difficult to use due to the necessity of solving large linear systems of equations at each step.
The "symmetrization" also helps to avoid the combinatorial nature of LP. On the other hand, finding NE drastically reduces the complexity as compared with using PGP or EPG for finding Walras-Wald Equilibrium, which requires at each step solving one or two quadratic programming problem: P Ω (x + tg(x)) = argmin{||y − (x + tg(x))|| |y ∈ Ω}, where Ω = {x : Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0}.
Both the PGP and the EPG can be viewed as pricing mechanisms for finding NE, which make the prices c(x * ) consistent with the output x * and the resource availability b(λ * ) consistent with the resource prices λ * . Moreover, we have
It follows from (8.1) that at the equilibrium the market is cleared from goods, the prices for which can not cover their production expenses. It follows from (8.3) that a resource has no value if the supply is greater than its demand. It follows from (8. 2) that at the equilibrium for each product on the market the price is equal to its production expenses. It follows from (8.4) that for every resource in demand the supply is equal to the demand.
Finally, at the equilibrium the total cost of the goods on the market is equal to the total production cost, i.e., (c(x * ), x * ) = (b(λ * ), λ * ).
The complexity bounds (4.11) and (6.4), as well as the numerical results obtained, show that in a number of instances finding NE by the EPG method can be cheaper than solving a correspondent LP by interior point methods.
We have some encouraging numerical results, but the new technology for solving RAP needs much more numerical work and economic analysis before it will become a practical tool.
